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I. INTRODUCTION
Patients of academic hospitals receive most of their direct care from
medical interns, residents, and fellows who are one, two, three, or more
years out of medical school.' Although these doctors have graduated from
medical school, their post-graduate training is essential for board
certification.2 Most doctors cannot work in private practice until they have
completed an accredited residency program. While residents are M.D.'s
and D.O.'s, hospital faculty does not treat them as full-fledged doctors.
The lack of status classification of medical residents has left a void in labor
law protection for medical interns and residents. This void is confounded
by the lack of congressional direction for the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB or "Board") and the lobbying efforts by the American
Medical Association (AMA) and the Association of American Medical
* Barnard College, B.A., 2003; University of Pennsylvania, J.D./M.A. Bioethics,
2006.
1. See Nat'l Resident Matching Program (NRMP), Residency Match: About
Residency, http://www.nrmp.org//res-match/aboutres/index.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2006)
("To provide direct patient care, physicians in the United States are required to complete a
three to seven year graduate medical program-accredited by the Accreditation Council for
Graduate Medical Education (ACGME)-in one of the recognized medical specialties.
Certification requirements, as determined by individual specialty boards, usually include
formal training (residency) and the passing of a comprehensive examination."); see also
Fed'n of State Med. Bds., Directory of State Medical Boards,
http://www.fsmb.org/directory smb.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2006) (providing links to state
medical boards, which set medical licensure requirements assuming one to two years of
internship/residency).
2. See Katherine Huang, Note, Graduate Medical Education: The Federal
Government 's Opportunity to Shape the Nation's Physician Workforce, 16 YALE J. ON REG.
175, 176 (1999) ("These residencies serve as the sole entry point into the physician
workforce for both domestic and foreign medical school graduates.").
3. Id.; see also Am. Med. Ass'n (AMA), Medical Glossary, http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/pub/category/2376.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2006) (describing medical
licensure and certification procedures).
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Colleges (AAMC). As a result of the confusion regarding the status of
medical residents, residents are offered virtually no labor law protection by
virtue of their position as employees of hospitals.4 The ambivalence with
which Congress treats medical resident labor rights is further complicated
by the particular nature of the medical profession and its inherent extra-
legal duties to patients and to institutions.
Public safety concerns have prompted states to regulate some working
conditions of residents, including their hours.5 The media has consistently
pointed to the deleterious effects of long intern and resident hours on health
care and even on the safety of others on the road.6
The lack of coherent labor law protection for medical residents
originates from the original refusal of the national labor law system to
cover the health care industry at all until 1974.7 When the federal govern-
ment did allow the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or "Act")8 to
cover the health industry, it cautioned the NLRB to ensure that the new
labor law protection did not lead to a proliferation of bargaining units in
American hospitals.9 Congress feared labor disputes and work stoppages
would impede the service of patients in hospitals. 10
The NLRB struggled with the precise definition of "over
4. See Stephen L. Cohen, Doctors-in-Training: Our Last Indentured Servants, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 31, 2000, at M2 (referring to the "dismal working conditions" of medical
residents).
5. See Jay Greene, Petition Asks OSHA to Limit Resident Work Hours, AM. MED.
NEWS, May 21, 2001, http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2001/05/21/prsaO521.htm; see
also Tracey B. Ehlers, The Patient and Physician Safety and Protection Act: Crucial
Federal Legislation to Improve the Lives of Residents and Patients, 4 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J.
1, 5-8 (2004) (discussing New York's legislation regulating residents' working conditions
as well as similar legislation introduced in Pennsylvania, Delaware, and New Jersey).
6. See Liz Kowalczyk, Sleepy Doctors Pose Hazard on Road, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 13,
2005, available at http://www.boston.comIbusiness/articles/2005/0 1/13/sleepydoctors_
pose a hazard on road (noting that increased vehicle accidents by interns and residents
who drive after shifts longer than twenty-four hours at a hospital have exposed hospitals to
liability and prompted states to regulate resident hours); see also Steven R. Daugherty et al.,
Learning, Satisfaction, and Mistreatment During Medical Internship: A National Survey of
Working Conditions, 279 JAMA 1194, 1197 (1998) (noting lack of sleep among residents);
Press Release, Public Citizen, OSHA Denies Petition to Reduce Work Hours for Doctors-in-
Training (Oct. 10, 2002), available at http://www.citizen.org/pressroom/release.cfm?ID=
1239 (referencing data linking long work hours to depression and car crashes).
7. Karl A. Fritton, Labor Unions and Physicians: Strange Bedfellows?, LEGAL INTEL-
LIGENCER, May 31, 2000, at L10.
8. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2000).
9. S. REP. No. 93-766, at 5 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3946, 3950; H.R.
REP. No. 93-1051, at 6-7 (1974); see also Act of July 26, 1974, Pub. L. 93-360, § l(a), 29
U.S.C. § 152 (2000) (amending the NLRA to cover employees of non-profit hospitals).
10. See S. REP. No. 93-766, at 5, 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3951 ("It was this sensitivity to the
need for continuity of patient care that led the Committee to adopt amendments with regard
to notice requirements and other procedures related to potential strikes and picketing.").
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proliferation" and in 1989 decided to allow a maximum of eight bargaining
units in acute care hospitals." These units extended to nurses, physicians,
all other professionals, technical employees, skilled maintenance, clerical
employees, guards, and all other non-professional employees. 2 However,
physicians could not unionize due to other restraints; they were either self-
employed, or those employed by hospitals, such as attendings, were
considered "supervisors" and thus not entitled to unionize. 3 NLRB
precedent prevented resident and intern unionization by referring to
residents as students, rather than employees. 14
Boston Medical Center Corp.'5 overturned NLRB precedent and
classified residents as employees for the purposes of union organization.
6
If residents had successfully unionized, they would have the same rights
and privileges as any other union member, including the right to strike. 7
Organized labor is stepping up and offering residents money to
organize the profession. 8  While unionization may offer physicians
stronger control over their practices, residents are in a category of their
own. They train for a specific amount of time and are bound to serve their
host programs for this training.' 9 The AMA and other health organizations
consider the prospects of more resident control over their training,
including unionization, as a potential threat to American health care.2"
Part II of this Comment will discuss the match program, residency
placement, and medical training. Part III will discuss the Health Care
Amendments and their effect on house-staff labor protection. Part IV will
evaluate the NLRB path from the Cedars-Sinai decision, in which the
NLRB classified medical residents as students, denying them NLRA
coverage, to the Boston Medical decision, which overruled twenty-five
years of NLRB precedent denying residents unionization rights. Part V
will explore residents' attempts to achieve bargaining rights while choosing
11. See 29 C.F.R. § 103.30 (2005) (enumerating the eight bargaining units).
12. Id.
13. See 29 U.S.C. § 152 (2000) (defining the terms "employee" and "supervisor").
14. See Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 223 N.L.R.B. 251, 251 (1976) (finding that interns,
residents, and clinical fellows are students, not employees); see also St. Clare's Hosp. &
Health Ctr., 229 N.L.R.B. 1000, 1000 (1977) (confirming the Board's ruling in Cedars-
Sinai).
15. 330 N.L.R.B. 152 (1999).
16. See id. at 168 (finding that "[a]ll physicians, including interns, residents and
fellows" employed at the Boston hospital "constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of
collective bargaining").
17. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2000) (discussing rights of union members).
18. Fritton, supra note 7.
19. National Residency Matching Program (NRMP), Match Participation Agreement
for Applicants and Programs § 1.0, http://www.nrmp.org/res-match/policies/map_
main.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2006).
20. See infra note 112 and accompanying text.
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their respective hospitals and Congressional attempts to squash these
efforts.
In conclusion in Part VI, I will argue that without congressional
clarification of its intentions for professional health care workers, attempts
at achieving labor rights through unionization or other appeals to the NLRB
will be futile. The recently failed graduate student movement for
unionization has added to congressional vagueness. This recent failure
seems incongruent in light of Boston Medical, because the NLRB faced
similar questions when deciding how to classify residents and graduate
students.
I will posit that the reasons for the current futility of the resident labor
movement no longer solely depend upon the classification of medical
residents, but on the perceived effect that a successful labor movement
would have on the medical profession, the future careers of medical
residents, and congressional health care funding.
II. RESIDENT AND INTERN TRAINING AND THE MATCH PROGRAM
The National Residency Matching Program (NRMP), a non-profit
corporation known to most medical students as the "the match," places
graduating medical students in residency programs throughout the nation
using a computerized system that matches medical graduates' preferences
for various residency programs with the preferences of various hospitals.2'
The match receives a confidential list from hospitals and assigns fourth
year students to programs on the same day each year.22 The Accreditation
Council on Graduate Medical Education (ACGME) authorizes the
approximately 7,800 residency programs across the country.23  The
hospitals and the fourth year medical students must both agree in advance
to accept the match.24 Students are then locked into their choices and if
they choose not to accept their match, they will be barred from the match
25program for three years or, on occasion, permanently.
Fourth year students have no opportunity to bargain for better wages
or for better working conditions at their respective hospitals prior to signing
a contract. If they withdraw due to labor related issues, they might be
permanently barred from the medical profession. Thus if residents wish to
change their working conditions, they must do so after the fact through
21. Melinda Creasman, Note, Resuscitating the National Resident Matching Program:




24. NRMP, supra note 19.
25. Id.
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unionization or similar efforts.
III. HEALTH CARE AMENDMENTS 1974
From 1947 to 1974, hospital staff members did not have the right to
unionize.26 Originally, the Wagner Act of 1935, the precursor to the
NLRA, covered both non-profit and for-profit hospitals. 27 The Taft-Hartley
Act of 1947 then excluded non-profit hospitals from its definition of
"employer. 28  The Board chose not to exercise its jurisdiction over for-
profit hospitals for twenty years after Congress passed the Taft Hartley
Act.29 Congress then amended the NLRA in 1974 to include non-profit
hospitals.30 The Committee on Labor and Public Welfare report on the
amendments stated that it
could find no acceptable reason why 1,427,012 employees of
these non-profit, non-public hospitals, representing 56% of all
hospital emplovees, should continue to be excluded from the
coverage and protections of the Act.3
While the Amendments extended NLRA coverage to medical
facilities, it added restrictions on the labor protections of health care
workers, including notice requirements for termination of contracts and
strikes.32 These unique restrictions on the labor rights of health care
workers illustrated congressional fears that offering unrestricted NLRA
rights to health care workers could endanger American health care.
Although the Amendments specifically included the health care
industry in the NLRA's coverage, Congress offered no guidance as to the
26. Cynthia A. Sharo, Appropriate Bargaining Units in the Health Care Industry, 5
LAB. LAW. 787, 788 (1989).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See id at 789 (referring to the 1967 NLRB case exercising jurisdiction over for-
profit hospitals). Public health care facilities are excluded from the Act. See 29 U.S.C. §
152(2) (2000) for the Act's definition of "employer."
30. See Act of July 26, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395 (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. §§ 152, 158, 169, 183 (2000)).
31. S. REP. No. 93-766, at 3 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3946, 3948.
32. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d), (g) (2000). Section 158(d) increases the time for contract
termination notice from sixty days to ninety days for employees in health care institutions
when giving notice to the other party. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d). In case of notice to the Federal
Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) and state mediation agencies, sixty days notice
instead of the usual thirty days is required. Id. In addition, when bargaining for an initial
agreement occurs following certification or recognition, thirty days notice of the existence
of a dispute must be given to FMCS and state mediation agencies. Id. Section 158(g)
requires a labor organization to give ten days notice to the employer-health care institution
and the FMCS before it engages "in any strike, picketing, or other concerted refusal to
work." 29 U.S.C. § 158(g).
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appropriate method of instituting bargaining units in private health care
facilities. 33 This lack of guidance led to cumbersome litigation in which the
NLRB struggled to establish its own limits on a case by case basis.34
Eventually, the Board ruled that eight was an appropriate number of
bargaining units for private hospitals and would not constitute an "over
proliferation" of such units.35
While the coverage extended labor protection to over one million
hospital workers,36 it neglected to specify which health care workers were
actually entitled to unionization. This second deficiency in the clarification
of health care worker labor protection led to more onerous litigation.37 One
source of confusion involved the dubious supervisory status of professional
38health care providers. Supervisors are excluded from the Act's coverage.
The Board has applied various tests to determine which health care
professionals exercised supervisory roles and were thus excluded from the
right to unionize.39
While the supervisor exclusion of the NLRA provided an ample
source of confusion for the Board, the term "employee" provided just as
much confusion and a source for litigation.4° While a majority of medical
staff in academic hospitals are interns and residents, residents have faced a
tough road to unionization since the passage of the Health Care
Amendments.
33. See Sharo, supra note 26, at 790 (discussing litigation over the issue of appropriate
bargaining units).
34. Id.
35. See 29 C.F.R § 103.30 (2005) (enumerating eight bargaining units); see also Am.
Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606, 621 (1991) (holding that the NLRB rule authorizing
up to eight bargaining units in health care facilities was not "arbitrary or capricious").
36. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
37. See Mercy Hosp. of Sacramento, Inc., 217 N.L.R.B. 765 (1975) (certifying a
bargaining unit of professional nurses); see also Children's Habilitation Ctr., Inc. v. NLRB,
887 F.2d 130, 134 (7th Cir. 1989) (addressing the status of nurses); NLRB v. Res-Care, Inc.,
705 F.2d 1461, 1461 (7th Cir. 1983) (applying a "patient care test" to determine if the
apparent supervisory role of registered nurses was exercised for the interest of the patients
or for the interests of the employer).
38. 29 U.S.C. § 152 (2000).
39. Id.
40. See St. Clare's Hosp. & Health Ctr., 229 N.L.R.B. 1000, 1000 (1977) ("[T]he
precise effect of the 1974 health care amendments on the status of housestaff apparently
remains in a state of uncertainty.").
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IV. THE PATH FROM CEDARS-SINAI 1976 AND "THE PRIMARY PURPOSE
TEST" TO BOSTON MEDICAL 1999 AND "THE SERVICE TEST"'"
A. The Cedars-Sinai Decision
In Cedars-Sinai Medical Center,42 the NLRB held that the residents,
interns, and clinical fellows of Cedars-Sinai were not "employees" within
the meaning of the NLRA.43  Thus, they had no right to unionize and
residents were ordered to dismantle the house-staff association. 44  The
Board specified a variety of educational aspects of an internship and
residency at academic hospitals, including grand rounds, teaching rounds,
laboratory instruction,, seminars, and lectures. 45  The Board referred to
activities of medical residents as "training" activities.46 The Board also
noted that the "Essentials of an Approved Internship" referred to the
stipend residents receive as "a scholarship for graduate study.A
7
The Board thus concluded that interns, residents, and clinical fellows
were primarily students, noting the relationship between residents and
Cedars-Sinai was primarily educational, and not an employment
relationship. 48 The NLRB emphasized the purpose of residency as training
in its opinion, rather than the professional services residents and interns
actually performed with regard to direct patient care in an employment
capacity.49  Some legal scholars thus refer to this reasoning as an
application of the "primary purpose test." 50 The decision remarked that
interns "participate in these programs not for the purpose of earning a
living; instead they are there to pursue the graduate medical education that
is a requirement for the practice of medicine."'" This statement implies that
residents do not actually "practice medicine," but merely are training to do
41. See Gregory Gartland, Of Ducks and Dissertations: A Call for a Return to the
National Labor Relations Board's "Primary Purpose Test" in Determining the Status of
Graduate Assistants Under the National Labor Relations Act, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L.
623, 625-26 (2002) (describing the NLRB's "primary purpose test" and "service test").
42. 223 N.L.R.B. 251 (1976).
43. Id. at251.
44. The term "house-staff" is often used to describe hospital medical personnel. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 252.
48. Id.
49. See Univ. of Cal. v. Pub. Employment Relations Bd., 715 P.2d 590, 595 (Cal. 1986)
("[The Board] found that housestaff participate in such programs to gain an education, not
to earn a living, and that their selection of programs is primarily motivated by the quality of
the training they will receive, rather than the amount of compensation.").
50. See Gartland, supra note 41, at 630 (citing the Cedars-Sinai decision as an example
of the Board's application of the primary purpose test).
51. Cedars-Sinai, 223 N.L.R.B. at 253.
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so.
Perhaps most notable of this decision is the famed dissent of Chairman
Fanning criticizing the Board's decision to deprive residents of
unionization rights. Fanning criticized the Board for failing to adhere to
the simple definition of text in § 2(3) of the NLRA defining the term
"employee. 5 2 He specifically noted that students were not excluded from
the Act, thus "the relationship between 'student' and 'employee' cannot be
said to be mutually exclusive."53 The hospitals charge fees for the services
of house-staff and pay the house-staff from those fees. 54  Residency
programs offer no official grades or degrees. In fact, Fanning cited an
AAMC study that found that eighty percent of house-staffs' time is spent in
55direct patient care.
Fanning further cited a memorandum of "Guidelines for House-staff
Contracts or Agreements" distributed by the AMA to all accredited
teaching hospitals with residency programs.5 6 The memorandum called for
"fair and equitable conditions of employment for all those performing the
duties of interns, residents, and fellows."57 Thus, Fanning illustrated the
irony in the NLRB majority decision and suggested that given the plain
meaning of the NLRA, the NLRB decision was untenable. Chairman
Fanning's dissent foreshadowed the future NLRB decision which later
overturned its quarter century precedent.
The NLRB reaffirmed its Cedars-Sinai decision a year later in St.
Clare's Hospital and Health Center,58 in which it held that house-staff were
included in a category of students, "in which [they] perform services at
their educational institutions which are directly related to their educational
program.
59
The Cedars-Sinai decision reflected the NLRB's policy choice to deny
unionization to medical residents. It did so, however, on narrow grounds
and left quite a few unresolved issues. For example, the opinion assumes
that the NLRA granted unionization rights only to employees whose jobs
have little to no educational component.60 The opinion attempts to define
the "primary purpose" of a residency program and ultimately concludes
that its primary purpose is educational.61 It does not specify anywhere in
the NLRA that an employee who receives training on the job is not entitled
52. Id. at 254.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 255.
55. Id. at 256.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. 229 N.L.R.B. 1000 (1977).
59. Id. at 1002.
60. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
61. Cedars-Sinai, 223 N.L.R.B. at 253.
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to the labor rights therein.
The fact that residency programs had educational components gave
the NLRB fodder to support its denial of the residents' petition for union
certification. The basis for the Board's later reversal of Cedars-Sinai
closely resembles the reasoning of the Cedars-Sinai decision. In both
decisions, the Board emphasizes the dual nature of residency programs.62
The Cedars-Sinai decision, however, seemed to focus on the primary
purpose of residency programs, while the Boston Medical decision focused
on the services residents provide.
B. Boston Medical 1999: "The Service Test"
63
In response to staunch legal criticism, the Board reversed Cedars-
Sinai. Boston Medical, an oft-quoted case, involved a unit of house-staff at
the Boston Medical Center (BMC) that attempted to unionize. 64 To avoid
withdrawal of their union, BMC house-staff sought certification as a unit
with the NLRB.65 The hospital contested the certification on the grounds
that members of the house-staff were not considered "employees" and thus
could not unionize. 66 The Board overruled its precedent in Cedars-Sinai
and St. Clare's Hospital and held that medical interns and residents were
both students and employees and thus were entitled to unionize.67 The
Board ruled that "[t]he essential elements of the housestaff's relationship
with the Hospital obviously define an employer-employee relationship.
68
It added that house-staff pay taxes on their income, receive benefits,
including sick leave, vacation, and malpractice insurance. 69 The Board
further analogized house-staff to apprentices, noting that apprentices have
always enjoyed the protection of the Act.7°
While the Boston Medical decision was intended to overrule the
Cedars-Sinai decision, it did not contradict the reasoning of the decision,
but merely the outcome in the case-the Board's denial of residents' rights
to unionization. The Boston Medical decision adopted the Fanning dissent,
62. See Boston Med. Ctr. Corp., 330 N.L.R.B. 152, 160 (1999) ("Ample evidence exists
here to support our finding that interns, residents and fellows fall within the broad definition
of 'employee' under Section 2(3), notwithstanding that a purpose of their being at a hospital
may also be, in part, educational."); Cedars-Sinai, 223 N.L.R.B. at 251.
63. See Gartland, supra note 41.
64. Boston Medical, 330 N.L.R.B. at 152.
65. Tracey I. Levy, Collective Bargaining in the Elite Professions: Doctors'
Application of the Labor Law Model to Negotiations with Health Plan Providers, 13 U. FLA.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 269, 289-90 (2002).
66. Boston Medical, 330 N.L.R.B. at 152.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 160.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 161.
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which simply stated that the dual status of residents did not preclude them
from NLRA rights, including the right to unionize.71 Residency programs
did not undergo any significant changes which would warrant a renewed
status for residents. This decision reflected a new Board policy, rather than
a legal conclusion.
The NLRB recognition of house-staff's plight has done little to
encourage unionization among medical interns and residents.7 While the
decision officially recognized house-staff s right to unionization, it did not
clarify what would be their predominant role in the hospital-trainees or
employees. The NLRB granted added restrictions to residents' right to
unionize, as it did to the entire health care industry."
The residents' dual roles, however, present extra-legal barriers to
unionization which are not present in other industries. Residents spend an
inordinate number of hours in the hospital and often are directly serving
patients for twenty-four hours at a time.74 They have to answer to superiors
on a regular basis and their obedience directly affects the prospects of
future training possibilities and fellowships.
In addition, the fears of Congress (and earlier fears of the AMA) that
unionization may compromise the doctor-patient relationship or the quality
of health care residents adds another layer of complication.75 Residents
have tried other avenues to address their labor conflicts, including
contacting the Occupational Safety and Hazard Association (OSHA)
seeking regulation of hours.76 These efforts, while encouraging state
regulation, have led to no federal labor protection for medical residents.77
A group of frustrated residents and fellows turned to the legal system to try
an alternative avenue to the rights to control their labor conditions, but
were quickly quieted.
71. Id. at 160.
72. See Tim Cramm, Prognosis Negative? An Analysis of Housestaff Unionization
Attitudes in the Wake of Boston Medical Center, 87 IOWA L. REv. 1601, 1624 (2002)
(describing the impact of the Boston Medical decision as having immediately "virtually no
effect whatsoever").
73. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
74. See Debra F. Weinstein, Duty Hours for Resident Physicians-Tough Choices for
Teaching Hospitals, 347 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1275, 1275 (2002) (noting that residents' shifts
are permitted to last twenty-four hours and that residents often perform direct patient care
during their shifts).
75. See supra note 5.
76. See Press Release, Public Citizen, supra note 6 (describing OSHA's rejection of a
petition seeking mandatory eighty-hour work weeks for medical residents, with one day off
per week and no shift longer than twenty-four hours).
77. Many states have instituted mandatory maximums of eighty hours per week for
residents. New York State was among the first states to do so. New York Has New
Guidelines on Hours for Interns, Residents, THE JOURNAL RECORD, July 5, 1989, 1989 WL
5984517.
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V. CONGRESSIONAL VIEWPOINTS: THE NRMP AND 15 U.S.C. § 37b
(b)(2)
A. The Jung Case
A group of residents, interns, and fellows challenged the NRMP and
member academic hospitals alleging that the hospitals and the NRMP
violated § 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.7' The complaint was filed by
aggravated residents and interns on May 5, 2002 in the District of
Columbia. 79 The residents claimed that academic hospitals and the non-
profit matching program colluded to keep resident salaries artificially low
and resident working conditions similarly taxing.80 The residents argued
that the match program along with participating academic hospitals
perpetuated an anti-competitive program which constituted an unreasonable
restraint on trade.8 '
"The match" is responsible for the placement of 23,000 graduating
medical students in residency programs across the country8 2  When
medical students participate in the match program they agree to honor the
match commitment,83 thereby locking them into whichever residency
program a computer selects for them. This program leaves interns and
residents with little bargaining power.8 4
This Comment will not analyze the antitrust jurisprudence that relates
to the NRMP challenge, but instead will focus on the response of Congress
to the Jung complaint. Generally, the complainants alleged that the match
program involves horizontal restraints on price or salaries of residents.8 5
These particular restraints are generally regarded as per se violations of the
Sherman Act 86 "because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack
78. Jung v. Ass'n of Am. Med. Coils., 339 F. Supp. 2d 26,31 (D.D.C. 2004).
79. Heather S. Crall, Unreasonable Restraints: Antitrust Law and the National
Resident Matching Program, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 245, 246 (2004).
80. Jung, 339 F. Supp. 2d at 33.
81. Id.
82. NRMP, Medical School User Guide 2 (Aug. 2005), http://www.nrmp.org/res_
match/tables/2006_mso.pdf.
83. NRMP, Match Participation Agreement for Applicants and Programs §5.1,
http://www.nrmp.org/res_match/policies/map_ main.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2006).
84. See, e.g., AMA, FREIDA Online Specialty Training Search, http://www.ama-
assn.org/vapp/freida/spcindx/0,2654,TR,00.html (noting that the average first year internal
medicine resident salary is $38,172 per year with an average workweek of 64.3 hours).
85. See, e.g., Crall, supra note 79, at 256 n.87 (defining horizontal restraint as one
perpetrated by competitors at the same level of the market (citing WALTER NICHOLSON,
MICROECONOMIc THEORY (2d ed. 1978)).
86. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940) (finding
horizontal price-fixing per se illegal); see also N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1,
5 (1958) (justifying the per se illegal rule as efficiently avoiding a long investigation into the
history of the particular industry involved).
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of any redeeming virtue.
'"87
However, few cases present such overtly anti-competitive effects as to
trigger the per se illegality rule. 8 For other cases, courts will apply the
"rule of reason" test to an alleged anti-competitive industry.89 This rule
analyzes "whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and
perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may
suppress or even destroy competition. "90 Under this rule, after a plaintiff
alleges anti-competitive effects of a particular industry, the court will then
analyze the market to determine if the defendant's behavior provides any
pro-competitive effects on the market. 9
Courts have developed a third test, known as the "quick look" test to
evaluate a restraint that appears obviously anti-competitive.92 When courts
apply the "quick look" test, a plaintiff does not have an initial burden of
proving anti-competitive effects of a restraint, but the court presumes such
effects. 93 The defendant then has an opportunity to rebut the presumption
of unreasonable restraint on trade by proffering legitimate justifications or
pro-competitive reasons for the restraint.94  If these justifications appear
plausible, the court will use the full "rule of reason" analysis; otherwise, it
will censure the practice. 95 The Jung court did not reach a full antitrust
analysis of the NRMP.96 The court dismissed the action because Congress
had secretly passed 15 U.S.C. § 37b(b)(2), retroactively preempting any
antitrust actions against the NRMP.97
87. N. Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 5.
88. Crall, supra note 79, at 259 n.111.
89. Cont'l T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977) ("Since the early
years of this century a judicial gloss on this statutory language has established the 'rule of
reason' as the prevailing standard of analysis.").
90. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
91. See United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 669 (3d Cir. 1993) ("If a plaintiff
meets his initial burden of adducing adequate evidence of market power or actual anti-
competitive effects, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that the challenged conduct
promotes a sufficiently pro-competitive objective.").
92. See Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999) (noting that the "quick
look" test applies when "an observer with even a rudimentary understanding of economics
could conclude that the arrangements in question would have an anticompetitive effect on
customers and markets").
93. Id. at 770.
94. Id. at 771.
95. Crall, supra note 79, at 258.
96. For an analysis of the NRMP under a "quick look" test, see id. at 266-71.
97. See Jung v. Ass'n of Am. Med. Colls., 339 F. Supp. 2d 26, 38 (D.D.C. 2004)
(describing the effects of 15 U.S.C. § 37b(b)(2)(2004)).
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B. Congressional Response to Jung
Congress titled 15 U.S.C. § 37b "Confirmation of anti-trust status of
graduate medical resident matching programs. 98 The legislation states as
follows:
Antitrust lawsuits challenging the matching process, regardless of
their merit or lack thereof, have the potential to undermine this
highly efficient, pro-competitive, and long-standing process. The
costs of defending such litigation would divert the scarce
resources of our country's teaching hospitals and medical schools
from their crucial missions of patient care, physician training, and
medical research. In addition, such costs may lead to
abandonment of the matching process, which has effectively
served the interests of medical students, teaching hospitals, and
patients for over half a century. 99
The President signed this legislation into law as part of the Pension
Funding Equity Act of 2004.100 The legislation thus formed a prime
example of pork barrel legislation tacked onto a bill which was intended to
update interest rates for the purposes of reducing employer contributions to
pension funds.'' As the bill went into conference meetings, the above
rider did not exist. 1 2 In fact, a few senators objected staunchly to this
seemingly unrelated rider.103 Senator Bingaman (D-New Mexico) who sits
on the Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee commented:
[T]here were provisions included in this bill-at least one
provision that I think is highly objectionable.
Section 207 of the conference report creates an antitrust
exemption for the graduate medical residency program that
currently assigns medical students to hospitals where they are
required to work for 60 to 100 hours per week for an average of
$9 or $10 an hour. To people who are not familiar with the way
this place functions in recent years, they would be surprised to
find that we have written into the pension bill a retroactive
exemption from the antitrust laws related to this issue of medical
residency programs.
98. 15 U.S.C. § 37b (Supp. IV 2004).
99. Id. § 37b(a)(1)(E).
100. Pension Funding Equity Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-218, 118 Stat. 611, § 207 (to
be codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 37b).
101. See Internal Revenue Serv., Pension Funding Equity Act of 2004 (2005),
http://www.irs.gov/retirement/article/0,,id=19503,00.html (explaining how the Act's use of
a higher interest rate in the calculation of a pension plan's current liability works to reduce
the employer's required contribution to the plan).
102. See 150 CONG. REc. S3968-03 (daily ed. Apr. 8, 2004) (noting the objections of
various senators to the lack of vote on the rider).
103. See id.
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That being said, the antitrust exemption that is established by
subsection (b)(2) raises grave constitutional concerns. There has
been no justification presented to this Congress, to any
committee of this Congress for depriving medical residents of the
same protections under the antitrust laws that are enjoyed by
other workers and other Americans. I do not see how it is
constitutionally permissible to take away the equal protection and
the due process rights of medical residents without any showing
that is necessary or beneficial.
Frankly, this is outrageous for Congress to be legislating in
this way, without any hearings, without any testimony, without
any knowledge of what it is doing.
The reason we have debate on the Senate floor is to allow
Members to express views when we are getting ready to change
the law. This is a time-honored process. It is one that was not
honored in this case. As far as I know, there has been no debate
on the floor nor has there been debate in committee about this
issue.
This is a provision that was added in a conference, without
participation of Democratic Senators, and clearly it is contrary to
good policy and to proper procedure here in the Senate.'4
104. Id. at S3991-92. Senator Bingaman then drafted a letter to Senators Frist and
Daschle. The letter reads:
GENTLEMAN: We are writing to express our concern about legislative
proposals that have the potential to undermine ongoing antitrust litigation
against the National Resident Match Program (known as the "Match") by
granting the "Match" a retroactive antitrust exemption.
. It is our view that Congress should subject proposals like this one that hold
widespread implications for patient safety and the working conditions of
hundreds of thousands of medical residents to the regular legislative process-
including hearings and consideration in the appropriate committees-before
allowing it to move through Congress. This is particularly important
considering that such proposals would retroactively interfere with pending
litigation, in which the factual record has not yet been developed and the court
has not yet ruled on the merits of the claims. In addition, it is important for the
Committee to consider the specific language of any such proposal, as legislation
intending to exempt the Match could have broader, unintended effects,
including effectively immunizing price-fixing and other anticompetitive
practices alleged in the litigation.
By permitting such a bill to go forward without full consideration of all the
factual and legal issues, we would set a precedent that will encourage
defendants in all types of pending litigation to come to Congress for relief. We
request, therefore, that the Senate convene hearings on this matter before taking
further action.
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Thus, controversy enveloped the passing of this legislation, and it is
doubtful the rider would have existed without intense lobbying efforts from
the NRMP, ACGME, and participating hospitals. °5
The AAMC, the representative body of all accredited medical schools
in the United States and Canada, as well as over 400 teaching hospitals,
vehemently opposed all resident unionization efforts. 0 6 Coincidentally, the
AAMC, named as one of the defendants in the Jung suit, stepped up its
lobbying efforts after Jung filed suit and expressed uncompromising
support for the above amendment. 10 7 Allowing the unraveling of the match
would greatly diminish the AAMC's power over post-graduate medical
training. It comes as no surprise that the AAMC would oppose every effort
of house-staff to achieve more control over the process of resident
placement. Offering more labor rights to medical residents would cost
academic hospitals inordinate amounts of money. The cost of replacing
one surgical resident with a "physician extender," or other physician, is
$210,000 to $315,000 a year.108 In addition, residents perform many
responsibilities generally assignable to other hospital faculty, which allows
hospitals to offer less privileges or compensation to some faculty
members.'0 9







105. See CONG. REC. S3979, (daily ed. Apr. 8, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kohl) (noting
that the rider "will end many of the claims in an ongoing lawsuit brought by a number of
medical students and residents" against hospitals).
106. Chris Phan, Physician Unionization: The Impact on the Medical Profession, 20 J.
LEGAL MED. 115, 135 (1999) (discussing the reasons behind the AAMC's continued
opposition to unionization by residents (citing Memorandum from Jordan Cohen, M.D., on
House-Officer Unionization in the Boston Medical Center Case to the Council of Deans
(July 24, 1997))).
107. See Press Release, Ass'n of Am. Med. Colls., D.C. District Court Dismisses Jung
Lawsuit (Aug. 13, 2004), available at http://www.aamc.org/newsroom/pressrel/2004/
040813.htm ("I[T]he National Resident Matching Program has provided a fair and efficient
process .... [W]e are hopeful that . . . medical students and residency programs can
continue to reap the benefits of this valuable program.").
108. Marvin A. McMillen, The Value of Surgical Residencies to Community Teaching
Hospitals, 133 ARcInVEs SURGERY 1039, 1039-40 (1998).
109. See Weinstein, supra note 74, at 1275 (explaining that teaching hospitals are able to
retain faculty members at lower salaries because residents have such a wide range of
responsibilities).
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It must be noted as well that the federal government is by no means an
objective observer in the matter of medical residency funding and
regulations. Currently, the federal government is the main financier of
graduate medical education, "contributing $6.8 billion through Medicare,
plus additional sums through the Departments of Defense and Veteran
Affairs." 11  The federal government is constantly looking to reduce the
cost of medical care. Offering residents more control over their working
conditions would likely lead them to demand more money, money that
would have to come from the federal government or from private university
hospitals. Thus, the government and academic hospitals are appropriate
bedfellows in opposing resident labor rights.
Another suspicious element to the rider is that while it preempts
antitrust suits against the match regardless of their merit, it refers to the
program as "pro-competitive.""1.. So it seems that Congress made an
independent finding that the match does not violate the Sherman laws, but
it provided no data to support this finding. The rider further established
that Congress preferred to deal with the antitrust issue directly, as opposed
to the medical resident unionization issues, which were addressed by the
courts, specifically the NLRB.
The rider, perhaps as a result of its swift passage, has ambiguous
justifications. It is unclear whether Congress' main motivation for its
passage was a perceived effect on medical education or another reason.
Perhaps Congress believed that patient care would be compromised if
residents were able to bargain, as it did before, and while passing the
Health Care Amendments. That interpretation would more closely
resemble the AMA's early position on physician unionization and its recent
ambivalent opinion of the Boston Medical decision.' 2  It is clear that
intense lobbying efforts by both the AMA and AAMC affected the passing
of this rider.
The history of labor rights in the medical profession reveals a pattern
of congressional ambivalence. Congress passed the Health Care
110. Katherine Huang, supra note 2, at 176-77 (citing James A. Reuter, The Balanced
Budget Act of 1997: Implications for Graduate Medical Education 1 (1997)).
111. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
112. See S. Martin, AMA Treads Middle Ground on Residents' Unions, 40 AM. MED.
NEWS 34 (1997); see also GRACE BUDRYS, WHEN DOCTORS JOIN UNIONS 118 (1997) (stating
the AMA's position that physician unionization conflicts with the goals of physicians of
personal autonomy and patient welfare). In 1999, the AMA established its own house-staff
union, known as Physicians for Responsible Negotiation or PRN. The union guarantees
strict adherence to the "AMA's Principles of Medical Ethics." PRN's bylaws require its
members to take a "vow never to strike." Membership in the AMA and other equivalent
medical societies are also prerequisites for PRN membership. These requirements may
compromise the power of its members to contest various conditions in health facilities due
to its AMA sponsorship, but they also balance the duties of residents as physicians with an
opportunity to receive fair labor conditions..
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Amendments begrudgingly and tacked on a series of restrictions on the
exercise of health care professionals' labor rights. With the Cedars-Sinai
decision, Congress had little concern about residents' unions. However,
the Board's reversal in Boston Medical changed the setting and brought to
the forefront resident labor concerns once again.
VI. CONCLUSION: EFFECTS ON HEALTH CARE AND GRADUATE STUDENT
UNIONIZATION
A. Further Barriers to Unionization
If Congress continues to offer ambiguous support to resident labor
rights or worse, thwart the efforts of medical residents to gain more labor
rights, the NLRB might reverse its Boston Medical decision and turn back
the clock yet again. The Boston Medical decision made it clear that little
legal basis exists to deny medical residents unionization rights or any
NLRA specified rights for that matter." 3 Thus, unless Congress amends
the NLRA, no legal barriers exist to house-staff unionization.
Many other internal barriers, however, hinder medical residents from
acquiring labor rights. Unionization takes more effort than residents have
time for and many fear unions will compromise their goals as physicians.
A national survey of residents found that residents' willingness to get
involved in forming a union or serving as a member of union management
was inversely proportional to the difficulty and amount of time their
specialty required them to be in the hospital., 4 Residents are accountable
to their superiors for their future careers and would rather endure a few
years of grueling working conditions than do anything which might
compromise their careers." 5  Divisiveness exists among residents of
different specialties because each specialty seeks different benefits and
residency programs vary in duration.'1 6 A resident is less likely to sacrifice
any opportunity to unionize for such a short period of time.
B. Graduate Student Unionization: A Different Animal
The NLRB has been similarly ambivalent with regard to graduate
student unionization.' 17 The main issue in contention in the graduate
113. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
114. See Cramm, supra note 72, at 1640 ("The analysis of willingness to get involved in
forming a union... was strongly correlated with a resident's area of specialty.").
115. Marcia Coyle, Resident Physicians Ask Court for Relief NAT'L L.J., May 21, 2002,
at A1, available at WL 5/20/02 NLJ Al.
116. See Cramm, supra note 72, at 1637-42 (speaking to the perceptions of different
residents on the possible benefits of a union and the likelihood of residents to strike).
117. Compare New York University, 332 N.L.R.B. 1205, 1206 (2000) (holding that
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student unionization cases is whether or not graduate students -are
"employees" under the NLRA.118  The NLRB confronted the same issue
with regard to medical residents and concluded that residents were both
trainees and employees.1" 9 The Board decided the same with respect to
graduate students in 2000 and reversed that decision in mid-2004. 120 The
New York University decision in 2000 relied heavily on the Boston Medical
Board decision.' 2 ' The Board has not reversed its decision in Boston
Medical nor has it implied that it will.
Medical residents have qualitatively different positions than graduate
students. These differences can help, but in the present case also hinder
medical residents' fight for labor rights. Residents are an integral part of
the national health care system and as physicians owe duties to their
patients and to their superiors that graduate students do not owe to their
advisors or to the students they assist. From the most ancient codes of
medical ethics to recent manifestations, doctors are charged with a duty of
non-maleficence, or to do no harm, and beneficence. 2 2 These duties often
require a degree of selflessness that is difficult to reconcile with
unionization and other avenues to labor rights. Doctors are -fiduciaries to
their patients. 123 Physicians have a duty to protect their patients' privacy.
1 24
What if patient records are required in an NLRB certification hearing or
graduate student assistants, research assistants, and graduate student graders are
"employees" under the National Labor Relations Act) with Brown University, 342 N.L.R.B.
No. 42 (July 13, 2004) (overruling the New York University decision to hold that graduate
students are not "employees" within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act).
118. See, e.g., New York Univ., 332 N.L.R.B. at 1205 ("The principle issue presented by
this case is whether a university's graduate assistants (teaching assistants, graduate
assistants, and research assistants) are employees within the meaning of Section 2(3) of the
Act.").
119. Boston Med. Ctr. Corp., 330 N.L.R.B. 152, 152 (1999).
120. See supra note 117.
121. See New York Univ., 332 N.L.R.B. at 1206.
The Board concluded in Boston Medical Center that these cases were wrongly
decided as a matter of statutory construction and policy and that the house staff
in Boston Medical Center were employees under Section 2(3), notwithstanding
that they also were students.
Applying these principles, we reach the same conclusion with respect to
graduate assistants.
Id.
122. See, e.g., Monique A. Anawis, The Ethics of Physician Unionization: What Will
Happen If Your Doctor Becomes a Teamster, 6 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 83, 86-87
(2002) (noting that "[t]he Hippocratic oath articulates an ethical cornerstone of physicians:
first, do no harm" and that "[t]he beneficent goals of medicine are intimately linked with
those of non-maleficence").
123. Id. at 85.
124. See id. at 87 ("Maintaining patient confidentiality is key to the patient-doctor
relationship....").
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another proceeding to enforce a resident's labor right? Residents' and
physicians' tepid reactions to the prospects of unionization are a further
impediment to congressional clarity. The medical profession has not
offered clear directions for balancing the duties of physicians and the rights
owed to those working physicians.
Managed care and medical integration has gradually eroded the
intimate doctor-patient relationships of the past. 125 The role of physicians
has changed. Doctors have to deal with different pressures and access to
labor rights can ease some of these burdens. The role of residents has
become even more complicated than that of regular physicians. They have
to deal with their training, superiors, and the long, grueling hours. It is
these further complications that have confused the labor rights status of
medical residents beyond that of regular physicians and beyond that of
graduate students.
A combination of congressional policy clarification, professional
health organizations' involvement, and NLRB direction might serve to
encourage medical resident unionization that could accommodate the
nature of a residency program and the medical profession appropriately.
Medical students and graduates should have the opportunity to contribute
to the discussion. Congress continues to struggle to find an appropriate
solution to physician shortages in this country, as well as a lack of
sufficient funds to support further residencies across the United States.
26
Hospitals should give residents a real opportunity to unionize. This
may involve hiring labor consultants who are not physicians or assigning
more duties to hospital administrators. An informed, inclusive dialogue
will serve to clarify legal and extra-legal barriers to accomplishing these
congressional goals as well as to alleviate medical residents' labor burdens.
125. See Phan, supra note 106, at 117 (noting that erosion of "the foundation of the
physician-patient relationship . . . . is primarily caused by managed health care plans
exercising a significant amount of economic leverage over physicians").
126. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
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